The Robin Hood squeeze: Burbank already pays into California’s school system — then we are asked to pay again.

Let us be plain. The Burbank Republican Party opposes California’s school-funding allocation system and every attempt to make local taxpayers repair it with another bond or parcel tax. Burbank households and businesses already contribute through income, sales, corporation, insurance and property taxes, federal taxes, existing school-bond levies and other charges. A new local tax does not reform the formula. It simply adds another bill.

Precision matters. Proposition 98 establishes California’s minimum funding guarantee for K–14 education. The Local Control Funding Formula determines most district allocations. Burbank receives LCFF base and supplemental funding, but at a 38.4% unduplicated-pupil rate it remains below the 55% threshold for concentration funding. That is the policy we want Sacramento to reform.

Start with the simple picture

Before the formulas and the acronyms, one plain fact: Burbank residents and businesses already contribute through multiple state, federal and local revenue streams. The district’s own adopted budget shows where school money appears — and where bonds, parcel taxes, construction fees and unrelated state charges do not.

That is the fair-share point, item by item. State school aid is supported by a General Fund filled principally by personal income, sales and use, corporation and insurance taxes, alongside smaller receipts. Burbank already supplies the local property-tax share counted inside LCFF. Lottery proceeds, federal programs and categorical state grants add separate streams. Homeowners and renters then carry voter-approved school-bond levies, while builders and ultimately buyers or tenants absorb facilities fees. The argument is not that every tax or fee becomes a classroom dollar; it is that Burbank households and businesses contribute through a wide tax-and-revenue stack before any new local measure is proposed.

It was not always so — how we lost control of our own money

Read the arc plainly. Property-tax allocation became centralized, Proposition 98 established the statewide minimum, and LCFF later determined how most of that protected pool is distributed among districts. The argument here is not that Burbank receives nothing; it is that the current allocation rules leave Burbank below the concentration threshold and local officials repeatedly answer that pressure with another local tax proposal.

Fact check: Prop 98 is the floor; LCFF is the Robin Hood formula

Precision matters because Sacramento should not be allowed to hide behind a jumble of ballot numbers and acronyms. Proposition 98 did not itself create the equalization formula. The court-ordered equalization movement began with Serrano; Proposition 13 centralized control over the allocation of the base property tax; and Proposition 98 later guaranteed a minimum statewide funding level for K–14 education. The modern “Robin Hood” mechanism is the Local Control Funding Formula: every district receives a base amount, while supplemental and concentration grants steer more of the statewide pot to districts with larger shares of high-need students.

The effect on Burbank is the injustice at the center of this report. Our property-tax contribution is counted first, state aid fills only the formula balance, and targeted dollars are then weighted toward other districts. Burbank families have already paid our fair share through income tax, sales and use tax, and property tax; LCFF determines how much of the statewide pool comes home. A new parcel tax does not fix that formula. It merely charges Burbank again.

The Sacramento overhead drag — itemized, not exaggerated

The bureaucracy handling California education money is real and expensive. The enacted 2025–26 state budget authorizes the California Department of Education to spend $509.5 million on state operations across all funds. That includes 2,683 positions, $358.6 million in personnel costs, $146.5 million in operating expenses and equipment, and $4.4 million in special items. The State Board of Education alone accounts for $5.4 million and 24.1 positions within that structure.

LCFF leaves Burbank below the concentration threshold

Proposition 98 protects a statewide minimum. LCFF decides how most of that protected funding is allocated. At a 38.4% unduplicated-pupil rate, Burbank receives base and supplemental funding but no concentration funding, which applies only to the portion above 55%. That is a real policy choice — and it is the choice Sacramento can change without weakening the statewide school-funding floor.

The objection is not that struggling children elsewhere should receive nothing. It is that the formula should not create a sharp divide and then leave local officials to answer every budget pressure with another bond or parcel-tax proposal.

• Keep the statewide minimum. Every California child deserves a properly funded school.
• End the concentration cliff. A student does not become suddenly cheaper because a district is just below the 55% threshold.
• Stop the second bill. Sacramento should reform the formula before local officials ask already-taxed households for another bond or parcel tax.

Then comes the second bill — the local tax stack

Burbank residents already pay into the statewide system, and BUSD’s locally allocated property-tax revenue is counted inside its LCFF sources. Local bonds and parcel taxes are separate charges layered on top. They may fund local purposes, but they do not repair LCFF — and they still reach the same households, rental properties and businesses.

And it is not one tax. It is a stack, built layer on layer for more than a decade: two general-obligation bonds tied to your property, two parcel taxes the Board tried and failed to pile on top, a brand-new fee on construction, and continuing discussion of another parcel tax. Every layer lands on Burbank property. Here is the entire record in one place.

Add the two authorizations and Burbank voters approved up to $568.2 million in principal — $110 million in 2013 and $458.2 million in 2024. Interest and total debt service are additional. Before another bond is proposed, voters should receive the official issuance-by-issuance repayment schedules, interest totals and final maturity dates in one plain-English table.

A “growth” fee for a shrinking district

Look closely at the newest layer and the whole scheme gives itself away. In April 2025 the Board raised the developer fee — the school-impact fee that state law (Education Code §17620 and Government Code §65995) lets a district levy on construction. Every new home, and every sizable remodel or ADU, now pays the state rate of $5.38 per square foot of residential space and 87¢ per square foot of commercial — plus an extra 38¢ per square foot funneled into the district’s new “growth fee fund,” a projected $34 million over five years.

A “growth” fee — for a district that is shrinking. Burbank Unified’s own Facilities Master Plan modeled total enrollment falling 12% to 20% from 2023 to 2033, depending on the birthrate scenario. The district’s assistant superintendent asked the obvious question at the Board table: “Now here’s the big elephant in the room. We’re experiencing declining enrollment. So why would we be doing this?” Fewer children alongside a new growth-related fee is a contradiction taxpayers deserve to see explained with project lists, enrollment assumptions and a public accounting of the need.

And here is the sleight of hand that binds the whole stack together. Bond money and developer fees are legally locked to buildings — by law they cannot pay a single teacher or fund a single program. So the district gathers hundreds of millions for facilities, then turns around and says the classroom is still short — and uses that shortfall to justify yet another parcel tax. Three separate revenue streams, each walled off from the others, each used to argue for the next. The money you already paid never counts; only the next ask does. It is, in effect, a machine for manufacturing shortfalls — and Burbank homeowners are the fuel.

The largest alternative has been left off the tax bill

Use fewer buildings better — and make idle public space earn money.

BUSD’s own planning materials forecast a 12% to 20% enrollment decline from 2023 to 2033. A smaller student body should trigger a public review of how much campus space the district still needs. It is not responsible to preserve every operating obligation automatically, leave rooms and grounds underused, and then present taxpayers with another bond or parcel tax.

This does not mean closing a school by slogan. It means doing the work first: measure capacity, utilization, cost, travel, program needs and neighborhood effects campus by campus. If the evidence supports consolidation, co-location, boundary changes or closing an underused wing, the savings should be calculated and acted upon before residents are billed again.

We know BUSD lost resident students. We still do not know where all of them went — or why.

The district’s September 2025 report says enrollment fell by 1,382 students from 2018–19 to 2025–26. Its more detailed November presentation shows that the most recent one-year decline was overwhelmingly among Burbank residents, not outside permit students.

−434BUSD-resident students in one year

1,276Students admitted on interdistrict permits

9.2%Share of enrollment supplied by interdistrict permits

BUSD attributes the wider decline to relocation, employment changes, housing and living costs, and students moving to online education. It also reports releasing 100 resident students to other public districts, mostly for FLAG programs or employment permits. But that is not a complete customer-loss analysis. The presentation does not disclose a comparable count of resident children who chose private school, charter school, homeschool or other alternatives, nor does it publish a parent exit survey explaining why.

What Burbank families and taxpayers are saying

95 comments that bear directly on the case against another tax.

These are selected comments from 17 public Burbank discussions. Every item must support at least one of three points: use existing money better; fix governance, waste or oversight before asking for more; or right-size staffing and facilities as enrollment falls. Comments that instead argue only for greater spending are excluded. These are public allegations and experiences, not findings of fact, a scientific survey or a count of unique households. Select a quotation to inspect the complete original post or comment. Source opens the live discussion when it still exists.

Showing 15 of 95 relevant public comments

1. 1. Instead of whining about the measures that failed, demand for better appropriation of existing funds. It’s always the easier route to just ask for more money. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
2. 2. All goes to administrative positions as opposed to positions that directly help students Existing money and tax resistance · Source
3. 3. Administrators make too damn much....teachers? I dunno...70-120k? Seems about right to me....MOST Software Engineers in LA County are in that range (my industry) so can't be too bad overall. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
4. 4. It always is. His contract is still ongoing and so he gets paid. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
5. 5. what will it take and how can us concerned citizens help resolve this crisis? Vote for new BUSD board members who won't give pay raise to people like Matt Hill. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
6. 6. Have we paid off the Mike Hill debacle yet? There’s some money down the toilet. Lost teacher, admin and facility jobs right there. That’s where Burbank started its downhill slide. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
7. 7. You’re thinking the money they have now is being spent properly? Existing money and tax resistance · Source
8. 8. They also supposedly save for deferred maintenance- it's never a good idea to spend all your cash- gotta leave some reserves. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
9. 9. When people complain about residents that oppose tax increases that are necessary to fund important things, just remember this is a shining example of why. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
10. 10. Show up to a board meeting and make a public comment before they waste the money Existing money and tax resistance · Source
11. 11. External search firms are such a racket. Honestly, if you’re looking to make absurd cash for doing hardly any work, get into that business Existing money and tax resistance · Source
12. 12. the board handled it so poorly they’ll pay out the full settlement (and maybe more). Plenty of grounds to terminate but they didn’t follow the rules. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
13. 13. Measure ABC passed by 63% and the voters just gave them $400 mil to improve facilities. Per the article, there are fewer students every year. And now they're talking about a parcel tax?! Existing money and tax resistance · Source
14. 14. Didn't Measure I fail because it is tied to property tax? I think it's safe to assume given how high property taxes are here already, that not many homeowners could safely afford to pay more property tax. Existing money and tax resistance · Source
15. 15. You are correct, it was a property tax. 10 cents a square foot. So a 2000 SqFt house would have an extra $200 of property taxes. Existing money and tax resistance · Source

Show 15 more

What this index establishes: residents have repeatedly questioned stewardship of existing money, district governance and a cost structure that has not kept pace with enrollment. It does not establish that every allegation is accurate or representative. The captures preserve each complete public comment so readers can check every quotation in context; records, audits and a confidential resident-family exit survey are still needed.

Could district policy be driving some families away? BUSD publicly maintains DEI programming and equity policies, and outside critics have published district gender-support documents that they say exclude parents from some decisions. Those policies exist and the controversy is real. What does not exist in the public enrollment report is evidence tying either issue to the enrollment loss. The responsible answer is not to guess. BUSD should publish a confidential annual exit survey that separately measures housing, relocation, academic quality, safety, special-needs service, private or religious education, curriculum, DEI, gender policy, parent trust and every other major reason a family gives for leaving.

Outside permits can help cash flow today — and still become a long-term trap.

The students are not the problem. The policy incentives are. BUSD has actively advertised permits to people working in Burbank as little as ten hours per week. The district’s permit enrollment is now large enough to preserve classes, staffing and buildings that resident enrollment alone may no longer support.

• It can hide the resident warning signal. Replacing a departing resident student with an outside student restores a seat count, but it does not restore the confidence of the family that left.
• It can postpone consolidation. Imported headcount may keep an oversized campus footprint looking occupied even while the resident base shrinks, delaying the operating savings taxpayers deserve.
• It can create a sudden fiscal cliff. Outside permits fell from 1,375 in 2022–23 to 1,276 in 2025–26. Staffing and facilities built around discretionary enrollment become liabilities if that demand keeps falling.
• Gross attendance funding is not net profit. The district should subtract instruction, staffing, special services, administration and facility wear attributable to permit enrollment before calling it a financial benefit.
• Burbank property owners finance the local facilities. State attendance dollars may follow a permit student, but Burbank property owners repay the district’s local bond levies. Residents deserve proof that their own children receive first priority by campus and program.

The resident-first rule: no new or renewed outside permit should displace a resident from a neighborhood school or desired BUSD program; no permit cohort should be used to justify another building obligation without a net-cost calculation; and every annual permit report should show resident caps, transfers, service costs, attendance funding and the effect on consolidation options. Judge the policy by transparent numbers, never by disparaging children.

1

Right-size the footprint

Publish enrollment, practical capacity, occupied hours and annual operating cost for every campus. Compare consolidation, co-location and boundary options without disrupting special education, core programs or student safety.

2

Cut the obligations that empty space creates

Every unnecessary building or wing carries utilities, custodial work, security, administration, insurance, maintenance and future replacement costs. Show the public what each unused square foot costs before preserving it by default.

3

Hire people who know how to sell space

Use a qualified location manager for filming and a commercial leasing or public-asset specialist for unused space, paid against verified net new revenue. Build a professional location catalog, live availability calendar, one-stop booking desk and market-tested price list.

4

Put the net revenue back into the buildings

Instruction comes first. Require insurance, deposits, full cost recovery, background and safety rules, no interference with students, and transparent contracts. Deposit the net return into a published maintenance reserve instead of letting it disappear into general overhead.

BUSD already accepts facility-use requests, charges a processing fee and directs filming inquiries to FilmLA. That is a mechanism, but it is a passive one. The district’s public page does not present a searchable inventory, live calendar, annual utilization report, gross and net rental results, market-rate study or revenue target. The public should not have to assume that someone is maximizing these assets; the district should prove it.

$32/hrRegular classroom

$177/hrHigh school auditorium

$412/hrBurbank High stadium

$515/hrBurroughs Memorial Field

Examples are from BUSD’s published for-profit/fair-rental rate schedule adopted in 2021. They demonstrate that rentable assets exist; they do not prove the rates are still competitive or that enough hours are being sold. That is why the rates and results should be reviewed publicly every year.

Before another bond or parcel tax, publish this: each campus’s enrollment and usable capacity; every room, field, auditorium and parking area available outside instruction; occupied and rentable hours; carrying cost; inquiries received and lost; filming days; gross receipts, direct costs and net revenue; market-rate comparisons; and a five-year consolidation, leasing and revenue plan. California law permits fair-rental charges for qualifying uses and provides a process for joint occupancy with private or public partners. Use those tools responsibly before reaching into taxpayers’ pockets again.

Renters pay the property-tax bill too — here is the honest number

A renter does not receive the county tax bill, but the rental property does. The property’s rent revenue must support that bill along with maintenance, insurance and every other building expense. The careful question is not whether a housing provider typed a tax surcharge into your lease. The question is how large the property-tax expense is compared with the rent the building collects.

There is no single citywide percentage. Under Proposition 13, two identical apartment buildings can have very different assessed values because one changed ownership recently and the other did not. Rent is also set by the market, so no honest analysis can say every additional tax dollar raises rent by exactly one dollar. What we can show is how much of the property-tax bill is paid from the building’s rental income.

Now remember what renters already paid. Renters pay state income tax and state sales and use tax just like homeowners. The building’s rental income also pays its property-tax bill, including the BUSD bond levy. In the district’s adopted budget, $71.7 million in local property taxes and other local revenue is credited inside LCFF before state formula aid is calculated. Any new parcel tax or bond would be another layer on top. That is why every new ask deserves a complete, itemized accounting of what renters and homeowners already carry.

You may not own the building, but you are not powerless — because renters vote. Twice, Burbank voters rejected a school parcel tax. Twice, they approved a bond whose debt service appears on property-tax bills, including the bills for rental buildings. The next local tax proposal is already being discussed for 2026. Your vote can stop another layer before it becomes another recurring property expense.

Every levy on property is also a cost of housing

A bond is not only a line on a tax bill. It is a cost of owning the building, and in a rental market it is a cost of operating one. That cost does not stop at the property line — it shows up in rents, and it shows up in what gets built.

Los Angeles is the case study nobody has to imagine. The city permitted apartment buildings of five or more units at this rate:

Measure ULA, the Los Angeles transfer tax effective April 2023, is the closest thing to a controlled experiment. The UCLA Lewis Center estimates it reduced multifamily production by at least 1,910 units a year — an 18% decline among projects of 20 or more units, measured against the 2020–2022 average. Raise the cost of holding or transferring the asset, and less of it gets built. That is not ideology; it is the permit record.

So the question in front of Burbank is not only whether the schools need money. It is whether stacking another permanent charge onto property — in a county already permitting less housing every year — is the tool that fixes it.

Call it what it is: the double-tax squeeze

Burbank taxpayers already contribute through state and local taxes. Within LCFF, local property-tax revenue is credited toward the district’s entitlement before state formula aid supplies the balance. Then local officials may ask the same community to approve a separate bond or parcel tax for needs the regular budget does not cover. That is the documented double-bill problem: the first payment does not prevent a second local charge.

Understand the local choice plainly: proposing another tax is easier than publishing a complete lifecycle plan, right-sizing facilities as enrollment falls, maximizing outside-use revenue, itemizing management costs and building a statewide coalition for LCFF reform. That order of operations has to change.

So what do we do about it? Here is the plan.

This is fixable. There are exactly three levers, and every one of them runs through people you can reach.

We want every California child to have a good school. We also reject a system that leaves middle-need districts under pressure and treats repeated local tax measures as the routine answer. We create our community. We fund our community. And we expect Sacramento and local management to use that money transparently, responsibly and effectively.

Additional fact-check sources for the bond-budgeting and payroll sections: California Constitution Article XIII A, section 1(b)(3), and Education Code section 15278 establish the 55% voter-approval path, the facilities-only restriction, the prohibition on teacher or administrator salaries and other operating expenses, and project-level accountability for qualifying school bonds. The California Department of Education’s 2025–26 budget standards require districts to confirm that maintenance funding is adequate to preserve facilities for their normal life; CDE’s long-range facilities guidance calls for continuous planning and financing, including long-range maintenance budget items. Burbank Unified’s 2025–26 Adopted Budget shows Deferred Maintenance Fund 14 with $0 budgeted revenue, $0 budgeted spending and an $18,859.75 ending balance; Special Reserve Fund 40 for Capital Outlay Projects with $3 million budgeted spending, no budgeted revenue and a $12,935,500.53 ending balance. These fund balances do not by themselves establish whether all maintenance spending elsewhere in the budget was adequate; they establish the reserve figures voters should compare with the district’s long-range facilities plan and proposed debt. Payroll figures reproduce the attached fiscal-year 2025–26 LACOE payroll-reporting workbook. California Department of Education, California School Accounting Manual, Procedure 330, defines employee-benefit objects 3000–3999 to include employer retirement-plan contributions, health and welfare, OASDI/Medicare or alternative retirement, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, OPEB and other benefits.

Facilities, enrollment and outside-use sources: BUSD’s Facilities Master Plan presents enrollment scenarios declining 12% to 20% from 2023 to 2033. The district’s Use of Facilities page describes its request, approval and invoicing process and directs filming to FilmLA; the linked Facility Use Rate Schedule is effective August 1, 2021. California Education Code section 38134 defines direct costs and fair rental value for qualifying outside uses and directs certain maintenance-related receipts to a special fund. Education Code sections 17515–17526 authorize and regulate joint-occupancy agreements. The recommended consolidation and professional-marketing program is this article’s policy proposal, not a claim that state law requires it.

Enrollment-cause, permit and parent-trust sources: BUSD’s September 2025 enrollment update reports a 1,382-student decline since 2018–19 and approximately 220 new outside permits annually. Its November 2025 enrollment presentation reports 12,548 BUSD-resident students, 1,276 interdistrict-permit students, a 446-student total annual decline and 100 releases to other districts. BUSD’s 2026 permit notice solicits applications from families with a parent or guardian working in Burbank at least ten hours per week. The district’s 2019 Board minutes described permit screening for satisfactory grades, attendance and discipline and estimated permit-generated revenue at approximately $13 million at that time; the article therefore makes no claim that outside students are academically or behaviorally inferior. BUSD’s equity-policy page and 2025–26 DEI goals report establish the current programming; the Center for American Liberty commentary links the underlying gender-support and DEI documents and presents a critical interpretation. The quoted social-media comments are anecdotal and are not used as statistical evidence.

Additional fact-check sources for the state overhead section: California Department of Finance, 2025–26 Enacted Budget — Department of Education: $509.504 million in CDE state operations, 2,683 positions, $358.603 million in personal services, $146.508 million in operating expenses and equipment, $4.393 million in special items, $112.155 billion in local assistance, and $5.437 million / 24.1 positions for the State Board of Education. Governance and compliance findings are summarized from TK–12 Education Governance in California: Past, Present, and Future (2026), including its findings on fragmented authority, overlapping responsibilities and extensive reporting requirements.

Sources: Proposition 98 minimum guarantee and the “about 40 cents for each $1” relationship — California Legislative Analyst’s Office, annual Proposition 98 spending-plan reports. The guarantee is set by three alternative tests rather than a fixed percentage, and can be suspended by a two-thirds vote of each house. Current Expense of Education per average daily attendance — California Department of Education, 2024–25, presented via LA Almanac. The Los Angeles County Assessor’s 2025 city roll lists $34,240,754,027 for Burbank; sorting all 88 incorporated-city values places Burbank ninth. The approximate $342.4 million figure is simply 1% of assessed value before allocation and is not represented as BUSD revenue. Revenue itemization — Burbank Unified School District 2025–26 Adopted Budget: $213,382,021 General Fund revenue; $170,073,136 LCFF sources, including $71,651,717 in property taxes and other local revenue and $27,095,803 from the Education Protection Account; $31,192,954 other state; $7,984,906 federal; and $4,131,026 other local. State tax sources — California Department of Finance, 2026–27 General Fund cash-flow schedule. Proposition 98 purpose and operation — Legislative Analyst’s Office: voters created a constitutional minimum guarantee, met through state General Fund and local property-tax revenue. LCFF mechanism — California Department of Education and Legislative Analyst’s Office: local property-tax revenue is credited toward the LCFF entitlement and state aid supplies the remainder. History — Serrano v. Priest (1971–1977); Proposition 13 (1978); Proposition 98 (1988); and LCFF (2013). Local tax stack — Measure S, Measures QS and I, and Measure ABC, per election materials and the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder.

Renter-tax sources and method: The Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller’s 2025–26 Taxpayers’ Guide lists current BUSD secured-roll debt-service rates totaling 0.052359%. BUSD’s official 2024–25 major-taxpayer table lists the secured assessed values used in the commercial-scale calculation, a $30,551,765,940 local secured roll and $5,583,051,672 held by the twenty largest listed taxpayers. The California Board of Equalization explains the 1% base levy, voter-approved bond additions and Proposition 13 assessed-value rules. The City of Burbank inclusionary-housing feasibility analysis models $5,400 annual property tax per market-rate apartment unit against $9.546 million annual apartment rent for 248 units, plus about $20,000 per unit in public permits and fees in its development-cost table. The U.S. Census Bureau reports Burbank median gross rent of $2,192 for 2020–24. A dated rental-listing source reported a $2,477 median and supplied the advertised examples; availability and prices can change. Tax-cascade rates come from the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (Burbank sales/use tax and fuel taxes), IRS Publication 15 (Social Security and Medicare), California EDD (UI and ETT), and the Board of Equalization (gross-premiums tax). Calculations are accounting allocations; they do not assume that market rent changes dollar-for-dollar with a tax bill, and the indirect rates are deliberately not added because they apply to different tax bases and actors. Prepared by the Burbank Republican Party.